Phil Hellmuth专栏

发觉Hellmuth的帖子还挺跟得上论坛的形势，难道他真的在读论坛吗？不可想象。

发觉Hellmuth的帖子还挺跟得上论坛的形势，难道他真的在读论坛吗？不可想象。 ...
dolphin 发表于 2011-1-8 00:39

哈哈，这个应该是纯属巧合。还真挺巧的呀，好玩。

昨晚睡意澎湃，抵挡不住，今天才翻完。见谅。

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假日游戏中的深筹码诈牌

在上一专栏中，我写了每年回威斯康星都要玩的“假日扑克游戏”中的一手牌。这个专栏里，我打算写写在我们18个小时马拉松式的扑克游戏中发生的另一手牌。牌局是$5000买入的无限注德州扑克，$5-$10的盲注，每个牌手必须先买入至少$2000筹码才能进入牌局；另外三个$1000的筹码可以先放入口袋中备用。因为所有的牌手都必须至少买入$2000筹码，并且盲注是$5-$10, 每个牌手至少有两百个大盲，就是说，我的读者，这是一个“深筹码”扑克游戏！

大约牌局开始十二个小时后，一手牌有$20的Straddle（指UTG位置的牌手发牌前把盲注加至大盲的两倍，发牌后UTG+1 位置的牌手第一个在翻牌前行动 -- 弃牌，跟注，加注，等等，然后依次UTG+2。。翻牌前最后一个行动的是UTG,如果愿意的话，他可以再重新加注。翻拍后一切秩序恢复正常，SB,BB,UTG,UTG+1...Button), Jon Ferraro手拿Qc-10c跟$20入锅，另有包括小盲Jon Green在内的三个人跟。 转牌为Qh-10s-6d，Green过牌，另一个牌手也过牌，Ferraro叫牌 $120。 所有的其他人都盖牌，最后Green和大盲应叫。转牌是张8；Ferraro叫牌$450, Green跟，大盲跟。河牌是张3， 两个牌手都过牌, Ferraro叫牌$500。 Green刚才过牌，现在加注到$2200, 大盲盖牌，Farraro开始在椅子上扭来扭去。 30秒后，Ferraro对Green说：“J-9,呵？ 你一定有J-9！” Green什么都没说，仍旧一动不动地坐在椅子里。 又过了60秒，Green亮出两张底牌中的一张Jack，Ferraro在椅子中扭动的更凶了。Ferraro亮出 Q-10 -- 两张高对 -- 又过30秒后，他对Green说：“把锅里的钱给回我$1000,我就丢牌。” 象只受惊的兔子冲出来那般迅速，Green说，“搞定！” 于是他一边迅速地把大锅揽过来，一边翻牌亮出他的K-J（诈牌），并且扔给了Ferraro两个$500的筹码。Ferraro捡回他的两个$500的筹码，叹道：“我应该知道你在诈牌！否则的话，你干嘛给我看Jack？”

让我们再仔细来看这手牌。首先讲一点儿背景：在过去的六个小时中，Green打的非常紧，无论如何，在河牌上发射巨诈不是Green的风格。就我而言，也认为Green手中有J-9, 我有些期望他在转牌上，在Ferraro叫牌$450之后加注。当然，回头看，Green如果有坚果，几乎总是在转牌上加注来保护自己的牌的。那么，因为Green没有加注，说明他那时没有J-9。

另外一种可能性是Green有暗三。如果Green有暗三，那么或许他在转牌上不会加注，因为三个牌手都还有至少$6000筹码，当其他人有顺子，你是1：3.5的落后（10：34的赢率），为什么拿$6000在一个$450的锅里搅呢？ 沿着这条思路走，在河牌上，当Ferraro仅叫牌$500, 那么Green在这个时候可能用暗三来加注。

我喜欢Green仅示出一张牌（Jack)来，因为之前他曾经拿好牌做过同样的事来迷惑对手。如果Ferraro已经下决心盖牌了，我喜欢他的拿回$1000换取盖牌的建议！太聪明了！ 我不算喜欢Green接受Ferraro的建议这回事，尽管这么做他得了一些利。 在我看来Ferraro打算在一分钟内把牌盖掉。但是公平地讲，Ferraro之后的确手拿弱牌应叫了几个大的叫牌，或许Green的确做了正确的事。

我怎么觉得Daniel Negreanu老是喜欢言语上调戏Phil Hellmuth

“Slot Machine Hand” at the Aria

In mid-January I hit the luxurious “Phil Ivey Room” (the high limit poker room) within the Aria Hotel’s poker room to play in a $150-$300 mixed game.   After I won a nice sized limit Hold’em pot, upon further review I felt like the pot was a little bit lighter in weight than it should have been.  A little context: playing four handed, it seemed like the guys were jamming it up quite a bit, for example, just the hand before I was in the big blind with pocket eights and facing an under the gun raise from Christer Johansson, a reraise from the player on the button, I then made it four bets, and Johansson capped it (five bets).  In my experience I do not many pots capped in limit Hold’em before the flop.

The very next hand I had 7-7 in the small blind, the under the gun player opened for two bets, I made it three bets, Johansson called (from the big blind), and the player on the button called.  The flop came down 7-7-5.  I was a mildly astonished that I had just flopped four sevens (all sevens – the slot machine hand), but I bet out casually and calmly.  After both players called, I rechecked my hole cards (did I really have 7-7 in the hole?).  The turn card was an eight, I bet, Johansson raised it up, the third player folded, I made it three bets (not too quickly), and Johansson called.  The river was a four (7-7-5-8-4), I bet, Johansson raised, I reraised, and Johansson hovered indecisively with six black $100 chips in his hand.  Johansson obviously was thinking of reraising it and upping the poundage in the pot, before he opted to just call.  I showed down 7-7, and Johansson showed down 5-5.  It was a cooler!  A super lucky hand for me indeed, but let’s take a closer look at this hand.

My pre-flop three bet with 7-7 was pretty standard.  Basically, the three bet was an attempt to get rid of the big blind, and I certainly didn’t mind more money being put into the pot.  My bet on the flop was standard.  I mean, I would have bet A-K, or A-Q, or any hand that I can three bet with pre-flop, so why check when I flop the nuts?  Also, I know that there is a high probability that my two opponents were going to call a bet on the flop with tons of hands: like two over cards, pairs, and backdoor flush draws.

Johansson’s smooth call with a made full house is a play worthy of discussion.  A pro to smooth calling is that there is a decent chance that neither of his opponents is drawing live, so why jam out one—or both--of us?  I mean, by letting our other opponent in, Johansson may reap the benefits of say, a jack coming off on fourth street when the other guy has K-J, or a diamond coming off and giving the other guy a flush draw.  A con is that he loses some bets from me if I do have an over pair.  One nice scenario for Johansson--if I do have an over pair--is that he raises on the flop, I three bet it, and then he smooth calls and raises me again on fourth street: that way he picks up $1,350 ($450 on flop + $600 on turn + $300 on the river) more.  Plus, if our other opponent has a drawing hand, or an over pair, then Johansson wins more by raising on the flop.  The way Johansson played it, he would win $1,200: $1,050 ($150 on flop + $600 on turn + $300 on river) from me and $150 from the other guy.  So Johansson is giving up $150 in profits in order to give the other guy a shot at hitting an over card (or pick up a draw) to lose a lot more money.  All in all, it is a pretty close decision, but after writing this article I think that Johansson’s smooth call was the best move!

Poker After Dark Galfond vs. Durrrr

This hand comes from Week 1 of the 2011 version of NBC’s “Poker After Dark.”  The six handed lineup featured some great players, both old school (Huck Seed, John Juanda, Phil Ivey, Erick “Edog” Lindgren) and new school (Tom “Durrrr” Dwan, Phil Galfond), and the format was a $100,000 buy in sit-and-go; winner-take-all.  You can find this exciting hand on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVLwShjnNk0  This is the first time I have included a link to hand in my column, and I view this as a nod to the modern world!
With $600,000 in chips in play Durrrr had amassed $248,000, Phil Ivey was sitting in second place with $134,000 in chips, Galfond had $121,000, and Huck Seed was sitting on $97,000 in chips.  With the blinds at $1,500-$3,000 Durrrr opened under the gun for $7,000 with Ad-5d, Ivey folded on the button, Galfond peered down at A-K and raised it up from the small blind making it $19,500 to go, and Huck Seed found A-Q in the big blind.  At this point a lot of viewers must have been nervous for Seed, but somehow Seed managed to make a good read and fold A-Q to the aggressive youngsters.  Durrrr called $12,500 more, and the flop came down 9h-3s-2s.

With $42,000 in the pot, Galfond bet out $17,000, and Durrrr decided to move all in!  Galfond had $84,500 left, and he decided to call.  With the chip lead on the line ($246,000 in the pot), Durrrr needed a five or a four.  The turn card was a seven and the river was a ten, and Galfond had the chip lead.

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  Durrrr’s $7,000 min-raise is OK (the new school players like to keep their raises right above or at the min-raise level), and Galfond’s $12,500 reraise into a $17,000 pot is roughly a 75% of the pot reraise, and this is a little above the new school standard of 60% of the pot.  Durrrr’s $12,500 pre-flop call with Ad-5d is fine as he had position on Galfond.  But when you at home decide to make a call like that with A-5 suited, be careful not to blow all of your chips when you hit an ace, or a five.  But also be careful that you don’t fold the best hand either!  What I’m saying is that calling a reraise with A-5 suited is not great spot for an amateur to be in.  Making that call can lead to some very tricky situations on the flop.

I like Galfond’s $17,000 bet into the $42,000 pot on the flop.  Making a C-bet (continuation bet – where you bet on the flop no matter what hits after making the last raise pre-flop) is standard and 40% of the size of the pot is reasonable.  Durrrr’s all in move here was a strong move.  Presumably Durrrr thought that Galfond did not have an over pair and thus he thought that Galfond might fold A-K, or A-Q, or A-J; or that Galfond might have a hand like K-Q.

Galfond’s $84,500 all in call with A-K high was a great one!  With the blinds at $1,500 - $3,000 and $84,500 left in his stack, Galfond could have easily folded his hand and he still would have had 28 big blinds left in his stack: plenty of bullets to come back and win from.  If Durrrr had a pair like 4-4, or 9d-8d, then Galfond’s A-K would have been in bad shape (a clear fold).  So Galfond’s call came down to whether or not he thought that his A-K high was still the best hand.  Galfond thought it was, and he was right!  One factor that made Galfond’s call a little bit easier was that there were a lot of draws possible out there (straight draws and a flush draw were possible on this flop), and he was a favorite over most drawing hands.

回复 306# Phil Hellmuth

天黑之后扑克：Galfond 迎战 Durrrr

这手牌出自2011版NBC的“天黑之后扑克”。六人座的比赛，排列了一些最好的牌手，包括传统派(Huck Seed, John Juanda, Phil Ivey, Erick\"Edog\" Lindgren)和新派（Tom \"Durrrr\" Dwan, Phil Galfond), 比赛形式为$100,000买入的单桌比赛（Sit-and-go); 决出一个赢者（Winner-take-all)。 你可以在youtube看到这手精彩牌局：http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVLwShjnNk0 。这是我第一次在我的专栏中引用链接，在我看来这是向现代世界打招呼！

桌上共有 $600,000 筹码，Durrrr积攒了$248,000, Phil Ivey有 $134,000 筹码第二， Galfond有$121,000，最后是Huck Seed坐拥$97,000 筹码。 大小盲为 $1,500-$3,000，Durrrr 在枪口位手拿Ad-5d叫牌$7000, Ivey在纽扣位弃牌，Galfond低头一看，A-K,于是在小盲位加注到$19000，Huck Seed在大盲位拿到A-Q。此刻许多观众一定为Seed担心，但是Seed还是读牌准确，面对年轻凶手他弃了自己的A-Q。Durrrr又投入$12500应叫，翻牌为9h-3s-2s。

这时锅里有$42000，Galfond叫牌$17000，Durrrr决定全进（ALLIN)！ Galfond只剩$84,500 筹码，他决定应叫。这时锅里有$246,000，Durrrr需要一个4或者5才能赢。转牌是7，河牌是10， 结果是Galfond赢了，筹码领先。

让我们来仔细看看这手牌。Durrrr的$7,000小加注还可以（新派牌手喜欢做比最小加注稍微高一点点的加注），Galfond的$12,500加注到$17,000的锅里，大约是锅的75%，比一般新派牌手的标准60%再加注稍额微多了些。Durrrr的$12,500翻牌前应交还好，因为他对Galfond来说，有位置。但是如果你自己在家里玩儿，决定用同花A-5应叫时，当你中了A或者5时，小心不要让所有的筹码都随风而去了。但是还要小心，你也不能把赢牌弃了！我的意思是说，对于新手来说，用同花A-5来应叫一个加注，不是一个好决定。如果应叫了，在翻牌上会遇到一些非常复杂的情况。

翻牌上，我喜欢Galfond的$17,000叫牌，这时锅里有$42,000。做一个40%锅的大小的续叫（C-bet）（如果你是翻牌前最后一个加注的，无论翻牌怎样，翻牌后继续叫牌）是合理的。 Durrrr的全进（ALLIN)举动是非常强的动作，假设Durrrr认为Galfond没有超对，那么Galfond可能会弃掉A-K,A-Q,或者A-J，也许Galfond的牌是K-Q这样类似的。

Galfond以A-K高牌，$84,500筹码来应叫非常精彩！当时大小盲为 $1,500 - $3,000 ，他还有$84,500筹码剩下，Galfond可以很轻易地弃牌，那么他还有28个大盲剩下：有足够多的子弹来恢复生机。 如果Durrrr的牌是4-4，或者9d-8d，那么Galfond的A-K高牌就很糟糕了（明显的要弃牌）。 所以Galfond的应叫就由他是否认为他的A-K高牌为当时最好的牌来决定了。Galfond认为是的，并且他是正确的！ 有一个原因让Galfond的应叫稍微容易了些，那就是牌面上有很多听牌的可能性（在这样的翻牌上，顺子听牌和同花听牌都有可能），并且对于听牌来说，他是占优势的。

有次在BIG GAME里看到他骂Dealer哈哈 他知道对方是flush draw 哈 River发了张10 对方all-in他纠结纠结再纠结的CALL了 他读出路人可能是QK了 最后没draw出同花draw出顺了 哈 悲剧

有次在BIG GAME里看到他骂Dealer哈哈 他知道对方是flush draw 哈 River发了张10 对方all-in他纠结纠结再纠 ...
阿穆 发表于 6/2/2011 15:38

这手牌除了运气奇坏，还和前面的一手牌有个前因后果，这样Phil的运气就又坏了一层。按理说Phil面对这么个紧牌手Allin是有能力仍了他的两对的，可是他相信了fisherman的表演，以为对方在ontilt，侥幸地以为自己的两对可以打垮对方的TPTK，或是两对，居然应叫了！ 也可能和电视直播有关。。。

不过其实我觉得Phil Hellmuth 总的来说还是挺绅士的，就是运气不好的时候会象大宝宝一样的生气，电视台又特别喜欢抓这些镜头，因为很娱乐观众啊。。。这把牌他瞬间就说出对方有KcQc，一流牌手。。。

Stu Ungar’s Final Hand in 1997 WSOP

Thinking back to Day Two of the main event of the 1997 WSOP (World Series of Poker), I remember that I played at a table that was pretty stacked.  Sitting there on that day were World Champions Doyle “Texas Dolly” Brunson, Bobby Baldwin, Stu Ungar, and me.  I remember that Ungar and I were the chip leaders of the whole tournament, and we dueled all day long!  Unfortunately for me, I was eliminated the next day--on Day Three—with 27 players remaining, but Ungar went on to face John Strzemp for the title and $1 million in cash.

The final table was played outdoors, between the “Horseshoe Casino” and the “Golden Nugget Casino,” with the ESPN cameras there to catch the action.  It is always windy in Las Vegas, and I remember that that was an issue for the dealers.  Here is a link to video of the hand that I am breaking down: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9PjuBWtn3MI  With the blinds at $10,000 - $20,000 and a $2,000 a man ante, Ungar (with over $2 million in chips) opened for $60,000 on the button with A-4, and Strzemp (with less than $1 million in chips) called with A-8.  The flop was A-5-3, Strzemp bet $120,000 into the $124,000 pot, and Ungar studied his cards for a long time (more on this below) before he finally moved all in.  Strzemp called for all of his remaining chips and now Ungar needed to catch a four, or a deuce to win his third World Championship.  The five on the turn meant that Ungar now needed to catch a deuce and only a deuce to win the 1997 WSOP.  The river was a deuce, and Ungar became a three time World Champion of Poker!

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  Ungar’s $40,000 raise before the flop was a pot sized pre-flop raise and represented the standard for the time.  The new school standard betting sizes are different, and the standard today would have been closer to a $25,000 raise.  Strzemp’s $40,000 pre-flop call was interesting.  In 1997, it was more standard to re-raise with A-8 in a heads up position like this one, and if Strzemp thought that he had the best hand, then he should have reraised it!  The new school standard is to reraise in this spot as well.  Basically, I would teach my students to reraise if they thought that they had the best hand, or if they weren’t sure to reraise anyway (unless they had a strong read).  Because heads up A-8 is a pretty good hand!  Personally, I could have gone either way, depending on the strength of my opponent (How good is he?  Was he making any mistakes?), and my read.  If I thought that I could beat my opponent and I wasn’t sure if his $40,000 was weak or strong, then I would have just called.  If I thought that my opponent had a weaker hand, then I would have moved all in.

Strzemp’s $120,000 pot sized bet on the flop was not a good one.  Since Strzemp was going all the way with this hand on the flop, why bet it?  Why not check-raise the flop, and give Ungar a chance to bluff some chips off?  Or if you have to bet it, then why not bet less and try to appear weak?  After Strzemp bet, Ungar studied for a minute while he appeared to be studying his hole cards.  A few years later, after I saw the hand on tape, I told Ungar, “I know you only looked at the ace before the flop, and that you knew you had a ‘two across’ with it.  Then when the flop came, you knew you had either top two pair, or aces and a straight draw.”  Ungar acted very surprised and said, “How did you know that?” [“Two across” or “Two spotter” means a card that when you look at the spots on half of the underside of the card, there are two.  Thus a two across is a four or a five, a three across is a six, a seven, or an eight, and a four across is a nine or a ten.]  No limit Lowball players “Sweat” in cards all the time looking at how many spots they see on the side, and if, for example, they are even money to have a pair or to make a strong lowball hand (maybe a five pairs them and a four makes them the best possible hand), then they may make a huge bet; not knowing if they have a great hand or if they have squaddush!  After all, it is harder for someone else to read you when you yourself don’t even know if you’re strong or weak!

Ungar’s all in move here was fine.  He either wins the pot if Strzemp is bluffing, wins the pot because Strzemp folds a hand like A-8, or if he does get called by a better ace, then he can always hit a four or a deuce.  Strzemp’s call was a good one.  He correctly surmised that he had the best hand, and actually, when he bet the flop I think that Strzemp felt like he was going to go with it, if necessary.