Phil Hellmuth专栏

第一次看见世界高手的帖子，厉害啊，不过估计由于级别差太远，能用上的东西不多。

Q-Q Had to be Best Hand!

Deep in a $3,000 buy in WSOP (World Series of Poker) tournament, with 82 players left, and 72 getting paid, the following hand came up.  With the blinds at $1,000-$2,000, Ted Lawson opened under the gun for $7,000, another player called on the button, and I looked down at Q-Q in the big blind.  I called fairly quickly, trying to keep my powerful hand well disguised.  Why hem and haw, and thus reveal that I was thinking of reraising it?  If I did that, then the power of the trap would be lost.  The flop was 8-8-8, I checked, and Lawson fired out four $5,000 chips ($20,000) as fast as possible.  The other player folded, and I called.  I thought about raising it up, but why raise Lawson off of a small pair like 6-6, in which case he was drawing completely dead?  My trap was working to perfection!

The turn was a jack, I checked, and Lawson quickly announced, “I’m all in.”  I counted my remaining chips ($74,000), and then I went into the tank.  Why was Lawson betting it all?  Did he have pocket aces, or pocket kings?  Did he have pocket jacks?  [No, I thought]  I didn’t mind being eliminated outside of the money, although any cash I make would add to my WSOP record number of cashes (80 now).  A $74,000 bet into a $62,000 pot: just like that!  Why in the world was Lawson betting so darn quickly?  After a minute passed, I started to talk to Lawson.  I said, “You wouldn’t believe how powerful I am.  I hope you have pocket tens and then you’re just as dead as a doorknob here!”  This subtly suggested to Lawson how powerful I was without violating any rules.  I wanted to see his reaction when he suspected that I was powerful: was it fear, or was he calm?  I thought calm.

Finally, I flipped my hand face up and folded it.  By now, a ton of people (and press) had gathered around the table to watch this hand unfold, and when I folded my hand you could see a lot of confusion on people’s faces.  Lawson then showed pocket aces!  I felt like a genius!  I believe that I could count on one hand the number of players in the world that would have folded my pocket queens in that spot, but let me stop bragging now and let’s take a closer look at this hand.

Lawson’s $7,000 opening bet was a little high by today’s standards (2 ½ times the big blind), but it fits right into the historical standard of 3 ½ times the big blind.  My call in the big blind was very tricky, and not the right move for most of the world.  I would recommend to my student’s and friends that they reraise it up about $15,000 more.  Considering that Lawson had aces, my move was spot on.  I like my check on the flop, which continues my trapping line of play.  I like Lawson’s $20,000 bet on the flop, because sometimes betting a powerful hand (the second best hand out there in this case) works.  However, I also like a check here.  Why not check?  In most cases your opponents are drawing dead, unless they have a pocket pair of nines or higher, which is unlikely.  Perhaps the third player in the hand had a small pair and would have bet it, or perhaps the third player had a jack and would have hit it on the turn and paid off Lawson’s aces.  I like my $20,000 call, but I would advise most of you out there to go ahead and raise it up right here and right now: thus springing the trap!  The minute you call $20,000 your opponent knows that you are strong anyway, and he is likely to stop bluffing you, thus you are simply giving him a free shot at hitting an ace or a king.  Thus go ahead and move all in here, unless your sixth sense is going crazy!  Lawson’s bet on the turn was OK, but I would prefer to see him do two things.  First, bet a lot less, like $20,000 (I would have had to call that much!), what are you risking by betting less?  I mean, I may have two outs to win, and perhaps zero.  Second, Lawson should have taken his time.  Betting ultra fast is tricky, I’ll give him that much, but when he bet that fast it was a sign of strength to me.

pro fold, I　ｗｏｕｌｄ　ｎｅｖｅｒ　ｆｏｌｄ　ｈｅｒｅ．．．

Pocket Tens with Big Blinds

Early on in the 2010 WSOP (World Series of Poker) I made a deep run in a $1,500 buy in no limit Hold’em tournament.  One key characteristic that measures the way I judge my own play is how often I am all in and called during a given poker tournament.  And by that standard I was playing great poker as I wasn’t all in and called for 16 levels of play!  On level six--right before the dinner break—I was all in and called, and I was lucky when my As-10s outran my opponents A-Q with a ten on the river.
Fast forward to Day Three (level 23), and looking back I hadn’t been all in and called since that ten hit me on the river on level 6.  With the blinds at $10,000 - $20,000 and 16 players remaining, the following hand came up.  I was sitting on a short stack with $260,000 in chips when I peered down at 10-10.  Everyone else had folded in front of me and I had four players to act behind me, including the small blind and the big blind.  I studied for 30 seconds before I opted to open for $65,000.  The player directly behind me called, and everyone else folded.  The flop came down A-K-6, I checked, and my lone opponent checked.  On the turn a seven came off, I bet out $20,000, and my opponent called.  On the river a three hit, I checked, my opponent bet out $60,000, and I called.  My opponent showed down K-J off suit to collect the pot.
Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  These days the Internet math kids, of whom I have a great respect for, would tell you to ship it all in with 10-10 and only 13 big blinds left in your stack.  They would also say that you should ship 13 big blinds with a lot of hands in my position, like any pair, any ace-high, or even hands like king-high or Q-10.
Assuming a move in with Q-10; they would tell you that even if you did get called, then it is likely that you would not be in horrible shape.  For example, if you were called by A-K, then you would be roughly a two-to-one underdog.  If you were called by A-J, then you would be a three-to-two dog.  And if you were called by 9-9, then you would be a small six-to-five underdog.  Of course, most times you would not be called, thus you would add $54,000 ($20,000 + $10,000 + 8 x $3,000 [antes]) to your stack risk free.
I felt like 10-10 was too powerful a hand to move all in with, that’s why I opened for $65,000, which is a lot by Internet standards--a two-and-a-half-to-one sized raise is Internet speed—but standard for the old school line of play.  I hate the $65,000 call with K-J off suit!  I had been playing super tight, and I studied for 30 seconds pre-flop while clearly thinking about moving all in.  K-J is the kind of hand that you can get yourself in trouble with when you call raises with it, and I am the kind of player that could punish you for the whole $260,000 in chips—plus this guy only had $430,000 in chips to start the hand.  I like my little $20,000 min bet on the turn, but $45,000 would have been better as it protects my hand more and pretty much lets me know that I am beat when my opponent calls.  On the river, I think my opponents $60,000 bet was a good bet as I probably would not have checked an ace to him.  I do not like my $60,000 call, but I went with my read, and I do not mind that.  Sadly, I went on to finish in fifteenth place when I moved all in and was called for the first time in 16 levels and lost with my Q-9 to their A-6.

Phil’s A-Q gets Lucky

OK, I may owe a gentleman out there somewhere a signed book.  With four tables left in a $1,500 buy in no limit Hold’em tournament, deep into Day Two, the following hand came up.  A little history: I hadn’t been winning many pots over the last 90 minutes before this hand came up, but I had enough chips to not panic.  With the blinds at $1,500 - $3,000, I opened for $8,000 in middle position with As-Qh, and the gentleman in the big blind called.  The flop was Ad-Jd-4d, the gentleman checked, I bet $6,000, and he made it $16,000 to go.  I called, and the turn card was the 6s.  He bet $20,000, and I called.  The river was the queen of clubs, he checked, and then I checked.  Even though the gentleman was supposed to show his hand first, I always roll over my hand quickly when I think that it is a winner, so as not to “Slow roll” my opponent.
One pet peeve that I have with some of the new generation players is their total disregard for poker etiquette.  In golf, you wouldn’t shout in the middle of someone else’s backswing, and slow rolling is something akin to that on the scale of etiquette breaches.  A slow roll occurs when someone bets the strongest possible hand (or one of them), gets called by an opponent, and then hesitates for three seconds--or longer—before declaring their obviously winning hand.  This gives false hope to the player that called them, that they indeed have won the pot.  In the old days, if one player slow rolled another player, then it was news worthy!  The violated player would tell the poker world what had happened to him (“He shouted in my backswing!”), and then the other players in the poker world would come up to the offender, and say, “Why did you slow roll him?”
In any case, the gentleman folded his hand face down after I called, and then we went on a 20 minute break.  While leaving the table, this gentleman insisted that not only did he have A-K, but that he had the king of diamonds in his hand—meaning that I could only win with a non-diamond queen, of which there were two left (the queen of spades and the queen of clubs).  Many times players lie about their hands—this is standard practice—but this guy swore on his life that he had it, and it was easy to see that he meant it.
Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  I like my opening bet of $8,000, anything close to three times the big blind is OK, although on the net these days they open for more like 2.2 times the big blind ($6,600 in this case).  I do not like his smooth call with A-K.  I usually reraise with A-K figuring that I will win the pot 80% of the time right then and there; nothing wrong with taking down a $20,000 pot risk free.  However, his smooth call was OK.  I like my little $6,000 bet on the flop.  I could have anything with this size bet, and I do not want him to fold a hand like A-10c.  I like his $10,000 raise on the flop.  If you’re going to smooth call before the flop and take that line of play, then you might as well check the flop, and raise it up to eliminate someone beating you with a “Free card” (like a ten when they have 10c-10s, or a ten when they have Kc-Qc).  I like the gentleman’s check on the river, although personally I may have made a small bet.  I hate my check on the river!  I hit a twenty-to-one shot, and then I check?  I made top two pair, and then I check?  It was unlikely that my opponent was going for another check raise.  It was also unlikely that he checked a flush or a set of fours here, so why not bet?  I should have fired at least $20,000, and perhaps as much as $40,000.  In any case, I told that gentleman that I would give him a signed book, and I’m not sure that in delivered!

My Move with A-10

In a $1,500 buy in no limit Hold’em event at the WSOP (World Series of Poker) on June 2, I was sitting on $9,600 in chips right after the dinner break.  With the blinds at $300 – $600 and $75 a man ante, a player to my right (in the cutoff) opened for $1,200.  I was sitting on the button with A-10 off suit, and I opted to smooth call.  From the small blind Eric Lee made it $4,800 to go.  The original raiser folded, and I counted down my chips.  I could fold, I could call $3,600, or I could call $3,600 and move all in $4,800 more.  I studied Lee for a moment wondering if I had the best hand.  Lee is pretty young, and a lot of the young guns make moves with weak hands.  As I studied Lee I began to feel like he didn’t have a hand that he could “Snap call” for $4,800 more like A-A, K-K, Q-Q, J-J, or A-K.  But I thought that Lee was probably “Priced in” (where he had to call the $4,800 no matter what his holdings were).  Finally, I reminded myself that I had smooth called the min-raise to induce one of the players in the blinds to reraise it.  Now that I had received the action that I helped to induce, I would have to go with my plan and move all in, right?
So I moved all in knowing that there was heat on Lee--he only had $5,800 left—because he was basically putting his tournament life on the line with a call.  Plus, my move looked very strong!  You can assume that someone is super strong when they move all in knowing that their opponent will most likely call them (the pot was laying Lee three-to-one).  Lee studied for a minute, and by then I had the feeling that he had A-J, or 9-9, or something similar.  Of course, now that I thought that Lee had me beat I was rooting for him to fold.  Eventually Lee called, and I said, “You have A-J?”  He said, “No, A-Q.”  I said, “Nice call, you deserve to win this one.”  The cards came down A-J-7-4, and then to the whole tables surprise the last card was a ten!  It was the first time—and the only time--that I had been all in during this tournament, and it was the last time that I was all in until late on Day Three (level 22).
Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  My smooth call with A-10 was an interesting play.  Many players would consider my A-10 hand too weak to smooth call and set a trap with.  However, I do not mind my trap.  I did have two young players in the blinds behind me, and I had the impression that they were very aggressive.  Also, I like the fact that I smooth called very quickly.  Too often players study awhile before smooth calling with a hand that they are trapping with, and by acting quickly I sent a message that I wasn’t very strong.  I like Lee’s $4,800 bet.  By Internet math guy standards Lee’s roughly pot sized raise may have been too much (or too little!), but this raise size is in line with classic standards.  As to my all in move, the pro is that I set the play up, and I read him as not being super strong.  The con is that Lee is priced in, so that I can expect a call.
I went on to finish in a very disappointing fifteenth place.

有请论坛各位大大翻译，谢谢，同时感谢楼主更新~~让我学到不少

A10 is not a trap hand. Not a good play but very lucky.....

“Floating,” “C-bets,” and Craziness in London

On Day One of the $4,400 buy in (2,650 English Pounds) six handed maximum event in London at the WSOPE (World Series of Poker Europe), the following hand came up.  A little history: we started the day with 7,500 in chips, the European player sitting directly on my left had reraised me three times previous to this hand and I folded all three times, the Euro player on my left was playing a very fast and loose game, Loose Euro guy had the chip lead at our table with 30,000 in chips, I had 14,000, and I was playing pretty tight poker.  In the cut off, with the blinds at 100-200, I opened for 450 units with 8h-6h.  Loose Euro player made it 1,450 units on the button, and I decided to call.  The flop was 6c-4c-4d, I checked, Loose Euro guy bet 1,200, and I raised it up, making it 2,800 units to go, and Loose Euro called 1,600 units more.  The turn was the 9c, I checked, and Loose Euro bet 2,500 in about one second flat.  I called, and the river was the 10h.  I checked, and loose Euro bet 4,500 units.  I studied for a long while trying to figure out my opponents hand strength (more on this in my analysis below).  With 7,000 left in my chip stack: if I called and lost, then I would be in bad shape.  Finally, I opted to call, and Loose Euro guy said, “Your good, nice call.”  Music to my ears!  He then showed down Js-2c, and immediately a report went out about this hand on the Internet.

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  My 450 bet in the cut off with 8h-6h is OK, especially considering that we were playing six handed Hold’em.  Loose Euros reraise to 1,450 to go with J-2 on the button was an excellent move.  He sensed that I was weak, and he acted on his read.  My 1,000 unit call with 8h-6h was a little wild.  If I am going to call here because I sense weakness in my opponent, then I should have gone ahead and raised it up, not called.  My check on the flop was standard.  Why would I bet out here and miss what us poker players call a C-bet (a “Continuation bet” is a bet on the flop that you make after raising it up before the flop) from a super loose and super aggressive player?  I had to let him bluff off his money to me!  Loose Euro’s 1,200 bet was a standard C-bet.  I like my 1,600 raise because it defines my hand.  I am telling my opponent that I have a hand, or that I have a draw of some sort.  His 1,600 call on the flop with Js-2c was a very advanced move that we call “Floating” (Floating is where a player calls a bet or a raise with a very weak holding and with the intent of making a bluff on the next round of betting).  My check on the turn was standard, I mean, the 9c completed all flush draws, and what in the world could I beat now?  His 2,500 bet on the turn was a good one.  I mean, he called 1,600 more on the flop to float me, and now that I checked on the turn he was almost forced to bet out in order to continue with his line of play.  However, I do not like the fact that he bet so quickly.  Would he have bet a flush or an over-pair like Q-Q’s that quickly?  I think not; thus the quick speed of the bet was a clue that he was weak.  My quick 2,500 call on the turn was not great either.  Would I have called that quickly with a flush, an over-pair, or trips?  I think not; thus my fast call showed some weakness.  But I need to give myself credit here for my 2,500 call; I mean there just weren’t many hands that I could beat!

On the river, my check was easy, and his 4,500 bet was an excellent bet.  He continued his line of play, perhaps picking up on the fact that I was weak on the flop, and maybe he picked up on the fact that I was even weaker on the turn.  My 4,500 call on the river was a super tough call for me to make.  I only had 7,000 left, and the consequences of calling and losing were huge.  Honestly, I wondered if Loose Euro had pocket queens, and I almost folded my hand.  But I manned up, and made a terrific call!

If the euro guy bet $7000 on the river, would Hellmuth fold?