Phil Hellmuth专栏

谢谢你的辛苦劳作

Pretty Lady Bails Phil Out!

At the WPT (World Poker Tour) Championship event last week, I hit a key ace (I talked about that in my last column) to propel me on to Day Three.  After a long spirited battle on Day Three, with 20 minutes left to go in the day, I finally played an enormous pot.  The blinds were $3,000-$6,000 and JJ Liu opened for $18,000 immediately to my right (I was in the cutoff).  I called with Q-Q, the player on the button called, and then, from the big blind, Andrew Lichtenberg made it $50,000 more to go.  Liu folded, I smooth called again, and the button folded.  The flop was 6-5-4, Lichtenberg bet $75,000, and I called.  The turn card was a jack, and Lichtenberg moved all in for $161,000.  Decision time, decision time!  I counted down my chips, and found that I had only about $172,000, so this was a decision for my tournament life (almost).  Finally, I called.  Lichtenberg showed down K-K, and before I had a chance to utter a single word, the dealer burned and turned a queen.  Bam!  What a card for me!

How did I play this hand?  Well, I smooth called Liu’s $18,000 raise for two reasons: first, I wanted the loose and aggressive played on the button to enter the pot, or to reraise it; and second, I felt like a little disguise here was a good thing vs Liu, who I had covered.  I love the big blinds $50,000 raise.  It was not the size of the pot, but why drive everyone out of the pot?  My $50,000 call was pretty standard, unless I had some sort of “Sick read,” which I obviously didn’t have in this case.  On the fop I love Lichtenberg’s $75,000 bet.  An all in move here would have probably convinced me to fold my hand, and he didn’t want me folding pocket queens, pocket jacks, or pocket tens in this spot.  And a check on the flop would have allowed me to perhaps hit a “Free card,” like if I had 2-2, 9-9, or A-Q.  So Lichtenberg’s $75,000 bet protected his hand, but didn’t scare me away from calling with my Q-Q.  On the turn Lichtenberg’s $161,000 all in bet was perfect.  As to my call; it was a little weak, but it was still bordering OK.  These days there a lot of crazy internet players out there that are making wild unsubstantiated bluffs, and that is another reason that I just called all the way through this hand, translation: I was trapping baby!  And I could beat some hands that it may have been natural for Lichtenberg to bet like: 10-10, 9-9, 8-8, 7-7, 3-3, 2-2, A-K, A-Q, A-8, A-7, A-6, A-5, A-4, A-3, 8-7, 8-6, and 5-4.  Of course, it is always nice when you have a read on someone, and it would have been really amazing if I could have figured out that I was beat and then folded my pocket queens.  A great read can give you extra lives, but I guess that I brought my “B game” to the WPT Championships this time around.

It was pretty cool to hit a card, and to do it for the second day in a row!  Next column I will talk about another hand from the WPT Championships.  A hand where I was a little unlucky, but I should have known better than to commit so many chips to the pot.

thank you for your wonderful post

Phil Lucky on Day Six at WPT Championships

This is my fourth column about the WPT (World Poker Tour) Championships, and this hand comes up on Day Six, when we were playing from the final ten players down to the final six players.  With the blinds at $15,000 - $30,000 and a $3,000 a man ante, and nine remaining players, I opened under the gun for $80,000 with J-J.  A brief history: I had been anteing off my chips (playing almost zero hands), when I opened with 6-5 off suit and everyone folded.  The very next hand I picked up A-J and I opened again, and everyone else folded again.  Now I looked at J-J and opened, so this was the third hand in a row that I opened the pot with a raise.  Right behind me, Nikolay Evdakov made it $200,000 to go.  I called, the flop was Q-9-8, I checked, and Evdakov moved all in.  I had $345,000 left and I studied for awhile.  Finally, I called, and Evdakov tabled K-K.  Now I needed a jack for trips, or a ten for a straight to win this pot (I was about a three-to-one underdog).  The turn was an ace, and the river was a jack!  What a card for me!

How did Evdakov and I play this hand?  My $80,000 pre-flop bet was OK.  An $80,000 bet isn’t far off of the standard opening bet of three times the big blind.  Some would say that I should have opened for than $80,000 for a few reasons.  First, it was the third raise in a row for me, so opening for more--like $90,000 to $120,000--would be a stronger move.  Second, with blinds there are those who say that you should open for a minimum of three times the big blind ($90,000 in this case).  Interestingly on the Internet these days a standard opening raise is more like two-and-a-half times the big blind.  Why, because the players online do not seem to be defending their blinds every often, so that two-and-a-half times the big blind opening bet seems to win as often as three times the big blind.  So why risk more money when you are picking up the blinds, when the likely outcomes are that either everyone folds, or someone rearises it and oftentimes makes you fold your hand right then and there.

Evdakov’s smallish $120,000 reeaise was very inviting!  I mean, considering that he had K-K, his reraise was OK, but I would have been tempted to raise more, like say, making it another $150,000 or $160,000 to protect my hand.  My $120,000 call pre-flop is OK, but it sure looked like Evdakov had A-A or K-K.  And, if I really thought that Evdakov had A-A or K-K, then I could fold my hand before the flop.  However, the fact that I had raised three in a row influenced my decision.  I mean, no one looks strong when they are raising every pot!  Thus, I knew that I looked weak.  And because I looked weak, I wondered if Evdakov had reraised me with 10-10, or 9-9, or A-K?  In fact, I seriously considered whether or not Evdakov might have A-K.  My check on the flop was a good one.  Some players would say that I should move all in here on the flop.  I mean, if I am going to call anyway, why not shove?  Why check and give Evdakov a free card where he might actually hit his A-K, or smaller pair?  Well, I wanted to give Evdakov the chance to bluff all in with A-K, or with 10-10, or with another bluffing like hand.

Evdakov’s all in move on the flop was pretty standard.  As to my call: well, by now Evdakov had shown a ton of strength, and it could be argued that I had to fold my hand for my last $342,000.  I called because I thought it possible that Evdakov had A-K, or 10-10.  Also, I did have a straight draw if I was wrong.  Next week I will talk about a hand that came up when we were down to the final eight players in the WPT Championship event.

Fold for your Country, Team USA!

Recently I was asked to be the Captain of Team USA in the World Team Poker Championships (it will be shown on Fox Sports Net in August).  However, something didn’t feel right to me, I mean, wasn’t there an obvious choice to be Team USA’s first Captain?  I accepted, but I told everyone involved that if Doyle Brunson were available, then I would give up my Captaincy to him.  There were eight teams at the inaugural World Team Poker event, and most of the top poker players in the world competed for various teams like: Vietnam, China, England, Greece, Israel, Australia, Brazil, and USA.  Johnny Chan was Captain of Team China and he brought David Chui, and Chau Giang with him.  Team Israel was tough as well with Captain Eli Elzera, David Benjamine, and Michael and Robert Mizrachi.  Team Vietnam (Captained by Men “The Master” Nyugen), Team England (Captained by Ben Roberts), and Team Australia (Captained by Jeff Lisandro) were amongst the favorites as well.

Team USA was touted as the “Most powerful force in poker” and “The Dream Team!”  In fact, we had a combined 43 WSOP (World Series of Poker) bracelets between us, and Team USA members in attendance were Captain Doyle “Texas Dolly” Brunson, Erik Seidel, Chris “Jesus” Ferguson, Jennifer Harmon, Mike “The mouth” Matusow, Howard Lederer, and me.

The event featured a three game rotation of limit Hold’em, pot limit Omaha, and no limit Hold’em played across five tables with one team at each table.  Another feature was that the Captains were allowed to freely substitute any player at any time.  Being that pot limit Omaha is not my best game, I never played a single hand of it in this event.  Each five handed table had one team attempting to play down to the final two players.  Whenever there were two players left at a table, play was stopped, the chips were counted, and those chips were moved to the final table.  As tables thinned, Team Israel and Team England were completely eliminated, two of the favorites didn’t even make the final table.  Meanwhile Team USA was down to one stack of chips with three players left at a table, with me in the saddle playing no limit Hold’em when the following hand came up.  Team USA needed to out last one more team to reach the final table, whereas if we lost this stack, then we were out!

First, I won a few pots to move the Team USA stack up to around $38,000 when I was dealt K-Q in the big blind.  The blinds were $400-$800 with a $100 a man ante when Team Greece opened on the button for $2,600, and Team Vietnam folded.  I called, and the flop came down J-8-5.  I checked, and Team Greece checked.  The turn card was a four, and I bet out $1,600 on a semi-bluff (I figured to have the worst hand, but it was possible that I had the best hand).  Team Greece called, and the last card was a king.  That king looked really good to me, so fired out $3,500, but after one minute Team Greece moved all in for $7,200 more.  What the heck was going on?  Since I had been at the table for about twelve hands, Team Greece was all in four times.  Did he have it this time?  What exactly did he have?  I didn’t feel like it was a bluff, but I didn’t feel like he had slow played the hand either (like if he had flopped a set).  I couldn’t beat many hands, but I knew how aggressive the player was.  Finally, I called, and he showed down A-K!

On the sidelines, Matusow didn’t like my call, saying that he thought that the player would never bluff off Team Greece’s last chips on the river, especially after I bet $3,500.  Good point, I probably should have folded for the last $7,200 bet even though I couldn’t imagine what Team Greece had!  Also, none of the Team USA players liked the $7,200 raise on the river.  I mean, I bet twice so I probably had something and what was he hoping to get called with?

大名鼎鼎的Phil Hellmuth竟然也在这里！[s:159]

期盼得到更多的学习机会

不知道mark过没有，好贴值得再mark下，慢慢学习消化

Queens in the Big Blind

On Day One of the 2010 WSOP (World Series of Poker) main event, on the ESPN televised table, the following hand came up.  With the blinds at $150-$300, an aggressive loose young player opened for $700, an older woman (who was playing tight and pretty passively) called, two other players called, and I looked down at pocket queens in the big blind, and called quickly.  Five of us took the flop, and it was 10c-9d-8s, I checked, and then everyone else checked.  The king of diamonds hit on the turn, and I bet out $1,500.  The young aggressive kid called, and the older passive woman called.  The last card was the 6h, I checked, the kid checked, and the woman bet $1,000.  I folded quickly, and the kid agonized for a minute (probably because the bet size was so small that he felt like he had to call) before calling.  The woman showed down 8-8 and scooped the pot with her trip eights.
What happened here?  I like the $700 call from the woman pre-flop, although if you know that you are a tight passive player, then it might be better to reraise with this hand, especially against the loose aggressive kid (who probably has a weak holding).  A tight passive player might as well use their image to win a few pots here and there before the flop!  As to my quick call pre-flop it was a judgment call, and a decision that I made immediately.  If I were to have studied awhile before I made that call, then an opponent may actually have thought that I was strong pre-flop, and I was deep under cover setting a trap.  However, it could be argued (and the math kids on the Internet will argue this) that a raise here with my queens would have been better.  I mean a raise would have eliminated at least a few of my opponents, and thus given me a better chance to win the pot.  Maybe a $3,500 raise would have won the pot pre-flop!  Even I think that a pre-flop raise was a better move 80% of the time.  But this was the main event, and I was trying to play extreme small ball!  There was no reason for a player of my caliber to play a big pot with pocket queens, right?  Not when I believed that I could skate along and hit $100,000 in chips risk free.
As to my check on the flop, it was probably better to bet, but the reason that I checked was that it gave me some flexibility.  If one opponent bet, and another made a big raise, then I could always fold.  If everyone checked, then I could always bet the turn, with what would now look like the best hand.  If one opponent bet, then I could always raise it up, or smooth call, depending on what my reading abilities were telling me at the time.  I hate the woman’s check on the flop with trip eights!  I mean, she just flopped her set, and now she is going to give four people a free card?  I mean, if a jack came off then she would find herself putting in money with the worst hand.  Yes, it was a semi-dangerous flop, but she should have bet, and not a small bet at that.  I would like to see her bet 70% of the pot.
On the turn my $1,500 bet was OK.  You never know when everyone else just folds, or when you actually have the best hand, get called, and still win.  As to the bet size, that was OK too.  Some might argue that I should have bet more.  On the river, my check was pretty standard.  The woman’s $1,000 bet was actually OK.  She did manage to milk the kid for $1,000, and any seven beat her (straight).

oh my, real phil?