Phil Hellmuth专栏

这篇我来翻吧，上一篇有几个地方拿不准，不敢揽活。

Lessons with Jeff – Defending 9-9 Fold

Jeff的培训－为9－9弃牌辩护

在上几个专栏里，我透露了我为Jeff Shulman参加WSOP主赛事决赛桌所制定的“培训计划”。大体上，当自己还有2000万筹码，盲注 125,000-250,000／ante20,000时，我建议Shulman采取超紧手策略，并在入局时要加注五倍大盲。Jeff的老爸Barry Shulman, 就是靠超紧手策略赢得了WSOPE的冠军，而我们三人都认为这是最好的策略。顺便说一下，我也预见到了Phil Ivey同样会采取超紧手策略。何必要去冒险呢？Shulman和Ivey是最好的牌手，只需耐心等待业余牌手按耐不住自毁长城即可。巨大的压力：创造历史，ESPN的电视转播，世界舞台的中央，数百万美元奖金的诱惑，这些都诱发了业余选手WSOP决赛桌上的自毁行为。

当盲注升至 200,000/400,000时，Shulman在Button拿到了9－9，并用170万首个入局。随后Ivey在大盲位置全推了690万筹码。 Shulman在这手牌之前有1590万，他数了690万筹码，足足想了一分钟。有必要回顾一下此前的情形：当Ivey是大盲时，Shulman在 Button位已经扔掉了很多手牌。这一次Shulman加注了，他认为Ivey应该知道自己有一手至少像样的牌。当时我在做Internet直播，说到：“Ivey看起来不是特别好的牌，我猜是类似A9不同花之类的。所以Shulman应该用A-Q，甚至A-J去call。”Shulman扔掉了自己的9－9，当时有人说Ivey的牌是K-Q（这是真的）。

虽然很多好牌手比如Barry Greenstein, “大嘴”Mike Matusow以及“教授”Howard  Lederer都说很明显应该拿9－9去call，但我百分百站在Shulman一边，实际上我认为这是个明显的fold。当我做决定时我总是关注整体的图景。9－9够好么？是的。我会在其他比赛里call么？是的。因此第一感觉是这不是一个好的fold。但是这个fold使得Shulman仍然保留 1400万的筹码，这在决赛桌深筹码阶段的比赛中还说的过去，也使得他在与水平较低对手对决时有处于较有利的位置。但是如果call了，要么只剩700 万，要么剩2500万；但是700万的筹码将使Shulman处于不利的位置，并不得不拿一些较差的牌跟对手火拼。我赞同这个fold，因为我喜欢保存自己的筹码。扔掉9-9，耐心些，等其他对手被淘汰，到只剩四五个人的时候再瞅准好机会把所有筹码推出去。当我放弃一手大牌时我总是考虑这些因素。有一点要补充一下，Shulman很好地执行了自己的计划，几个小时后用自己的A-K全入，正好碰上了Cada的A-J。十个小时中只有一个全入，这是零风险的扑克。

一个小时后，只剩下5个人了，Shulman又用自己的J-J把Cada的3-3圈了进来。Cada这次走运，把Shulman淘汰了，但是如果 Shulman的J-J顶住了（他有4.5比1的优势），那么他就将在最后四人赛时坐拥3000万筹码！我喜欢这个9-9弃牌么？是的，尤其是后来的故事证明了这一点。Shulman本该拿到更多奖金么？是的，应该。

Lessons with Jeff – Defending 9-9 Fold

In my last few columns I have been revealing my “Lesson plan” for Jeff Shulman at the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) “November nine” (final table).  Basically, with $20 million in chips, and blinds of $125,000- $250,000 and a $20,000 ante, I advised super tight play, with 5x opening bets when Shulman did enter a pot.  Barry Shulman, Jeff’s father, just won the WSOPE playing the super tight strategy; and the three of us agreed that this was the best way to play.  By the way, I correctly predicted that Phil Ivey would also use the super tight strategy.  I mean, why wouldn’t he?  Why gamble?  Shulman and Ivey were the best players, so why not be patient and wait for a great situation to come up?  Why not wait for the amateurs to melt, blow up, and give it away?  Massive pressure: from making history, playing on ESPN and the world stage, and playing for millions of dollars cause a lot of self-destruction at the WSOP main event final table.

With the blinds at $200,000-$400,000, Shulman opened for $1.75 million on the button with 9-9, and Ivey moved all in from the big blind for $6.9 million more.  Shulman had started the hand with $15.8 million, and he counted out the $6.9 million and hovered for a full minute.  A little history: Shulman had folded a bunch of times on the button when it was Ivey’s big blind.  Now that Shulman finally had raised it up, Shulman assumed that Ivey knew that he had at least a semi-strong hand.  While doing the live Internet broadcast I said, “Ivey doesn’t look super strong, I mean I think he would move all in with A-9 off suit here.  Thus Jeff should call with A-Q, and maybe even A-J.”  Shulman folded his 9-9, and the word spread that Ivey had K-Q (true).

Although many great players like Barry Greenstein, Mike “The mouth” Matusow, and Howard “The professor” Lederer spoke out saying that they thought that it was a clear call with 9-9.  I am 100% on Shulman’s side, and in fact I think it was a clear fold!  I like looking at the whole story when I make these decisions.  Did 9-9 figure to be good?  Yes.  Would I make that call in a side game?  Yes.  So the beginning of the story was that it was not a good fold.  But it was a fold that would leave Shulman with $14 million, which was plenty of chips to play with considering the deep structure in place at the final table.  A $14 million chip stack that he could use to put himself in a better situation against weaker players.  A call however, would leave Shulman with either $7 million, or $25 million.  $7 million would really cripple Shulman and put him in jeopardy, and probably force him to play some big pots with some weaker holdings.  I love the fold, because I love to protect my chips.  Fold the 9-9, let some time pass, let some other players get eliminated, and then put your chips all in when you have way the best of it and there are only four or five players remaining.  I factor in these things when I make a big lay down!  And it must be told that Shulman followed his plan to a tee, and found himself all in a few hours later with his A-K vs. Cada’s A-J.  One all in pot in ten hours of play, that my friends, is risk free poker!

One hour after his all in, when they were down to five handed, Shulman had Cada all in with his J-J to Cada’s 3-3.  Cada outdrew him, but if Shulman’s pocket jacks would have held up (they were a four-and-a-half-to-one favorite over Cada’s 3-3), then Shulman would have been four handed with over $30 million in chips!  Do I like the 9-9 fold?  Yes, especially when the rest of the story goes like it did.  Did Shulman deserve better?  Yes, he did.

Next week, I’ll talk about an even more controversial fold Shulman made with A-K pre-flop.

不错

Lessons with Jeff – Defending A-K Fold

In my last few columns I have been revealing my “Lesson plan” for Jeff Shulman at the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) “November nine” (final table).  Basically, with $20 million in chips, and blinds of $125,000- $250,000 and a $20,000 ante, I advised super tight play, with 5x opening bets when Shulman did enter a pot.  Barry Shulman, Jeff’s father, just won the WSOPE using the super tight strategy; and the three of us agreed that this was the best way to play.  By the way, I correctly predicted that Phil Ivey would also use the super tight strategy (the Shulman’s, Ivey, and I all liked the super tight tactic).  I mean, why wouldn’t Ivey and Shulman both use super tight tactics?  Why gamble?  Shulman and Ivey were the best players, so why not be patient and wait for a great situation to come up?  Why not wait for the amateurs to melt, blow up, and give it away?  Massive pressure: from making history, from playing on ESPN and the world stage, and playing for millions of dollars cause a lot of self-destruction at the WSOP main event final table.

In last week’s column I defended Shulman’s fold when he raised it up with 9-9 on the button, and Ivey moved all in from the big blind with K-Q; by the way, this hand was shown on the ESPN coverage.  This fold was controversial, but the most controversial fold that Shulman made at the “November nine” final table didn’t even make it onto the television coverage!  After Shulman folded his 9-9 pre-flop, he was left with $14 million in chips, and that’s when Antoine Saout—who was sitting directly to Shulman’s right--opened for $1 million.  Shulman then made it $4 million to go with A-K, everyone else folded, and then Saout moved all in.  It was $10 million more to Shulman now, and after a solid minute of studying, Shulman folded his A-K.  On the surface, no one likes Shulman’s fold!  I mean, Shulman put 28% of his chips into the pot, and to fold A-K “Mathematically speaking” here you would have to know that your opponent had A-A, or K-K.  If your opponent had A-K, which is likely, then it would be a split pot.  If your opponent had a pair like Q-Q, J-J, or 10-10 which is also likely, then you would be a roughly 12-to-10 underdog, but then the pot was laying almost $19 million-to-$10 million ($4 million + $4 million + $10 million + $1 in blinds and antes).  No one likes Shulman’s fold (except Shulman and me), and even his father had mixed feelings about this fold.

However, to me and Shulman, the fold is about three things.  First, the fact that it was probably a coin flip (Saout had Q-Q, J-J, or 10-10), and Saout may have actually have had A-A, or K-K (in which case it was nothing short of an amazing fold); second, the fold is about the “Rest of the story”; and third, the blinds were still relatively low, so why not wait for a better spot later on?  I mean, maybe two or three other players would be eliminated by the time Shulman moved all in.

If it was a coin flip, then Shulman would have had $29 million if he won, or finish in eighth place if he lost.  And why gamble?  If the blinds had been bigger, and Shulman knew it was a coin flip, then he would have called.  With the blinds the way they were ($200,000 -$400,000), if Shulman knew it was a coin flip, then he could fold because of the rest of the story.

As it turns out, the rest of the story is that Shulman was all in as a two-and-a-half-to-one favorite with his A-K to Cada’s A-J, and Shulman won a $14 million pot.  Then Shulman played a $22 million pot with his J-J to Cada’s 3-3 (Cada was all in this time).  But Shulman was super unlucky and lost that pot--he would have had over $30 million in chips and been down to four handed.
So the level of the blinds, and a brilliant “Rest of the story” authored by Shulman made his lay down a good one.  The lay down is only a good one because the player involved was Jeff Shulman.  In other words, do not try this lay down at home!  As I believe that 99.9% of the world should have called with the A-K.

我很想翻译，但是估计我翻译的时间太长，翻译出来可能也让很多人看不懂  [s:155]

哈哈，别人翻译是担心自己的英文不够好，小顺子正好相反，是担心自己的中文不够好。 [s:167]

不妨翻译一篇，即帮了大家，也给大家一个帮助你提高中文的机会。你看David，自从在智游城发贴以来，中文进步多大啊。 [s:167]  [s:167]  [s:167]

我很想翻译，但是估计我翻译的时间太长，翻译出来可能也让很多人看不懂  [s:155]

谢谢各位老兄的翻译

哈哈，别人翻译是担心自己的英文不够好，小顺子正好相反，是担心自己的中文不够好。 [s:167]

不妨翻译一篇，即帮了大家，也给大家一个帮助你提高中文的机会。你看David，自从在智游城发贴以来，中文进步多大啊。 [s:167]  [s:167]  [s:167]

Rich哥哥这么一说，我就不能懒惰了  [s:152]

Lessons with Jeff – Defending A-K Fold

In my last few columns I have been revealing my “Lesson plan” for Jeff Shulman at the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) “November nine” (final table).  Basically, with $20 million in chips, and blinds of $125,000- $250,000 and a $20,000 ante, I advised super tight play, with 5x opening bets when Shulman did enter a pot.  Barry Shulman, Jeff’s father, just won the WSOPE using the super tight strategy; and the three of us agreed that this was the best way to play.  By the way, I correctly predicted that Phil Ivey would also use the super tight strategy (the Shulman’s, Ivey, and I all liked the super tight tactic).  I mean, why wouldn’t Ivey and Shulman both use super tight tactics?  Why gamble?  Shulman and Ivey were the best players, so why not be patient and wait for a great situation to come up?  Why not wait for the amateurs to melt, blow up, and give it away?  Massive pressure: from making history, from playing on ESPN and the world stage, and playing for millions of dollars cause a lot of self-destruction at the WSOP main event final table.

发现第一段跟上一次的一模一样，那我就不写了。

Jeff的培训 - 为AK弃牌辩护

在上几个专栏里，我透露了我为Jeff Shulman参加WSOP主赛事决赛桌所制定的“培训计划”。大体上，当自己还有2000万筹码，盲注 125,000-250,000／ante20,000时，我建议Shulman采取超紧手策略，并在入局时要加注五倍大盲。Jeff的老爸Barry Shulman, 就是靠超紧手策略赢得了WSOPE的冠军，而我们三人都认为这是最好的策略。顺便说一下，我也预见到了Phil Ivey同样会采取超紧手策略。何必要去冒险呢？Shulman和Ivey是最好的牌手，只需耐心等待业余牌手按耐不住自毁长城即可。巨大的压力：创造历史，ESPN的电视转播，世界舞台的中央，数百万美元奖金的诱惑，这些都诱发了业余选手WSOP决赛桌上的自毁行为。

In last week’s column I defended Shulman’s fold when he raised it up with 9-9 on the button, and Ivey moved all in from the big blind with K-Q; by the way, this hand was shown on the ESPN coverage.  This fold was controversial, but the most controversial fold that Shulman made at the “November nine” final table didn’t even make it onto the television coverage!  After Shulman folded his 9-9 pre-flop, he was left with $14 million in chips, and that’s when Antoine Saout—who was sitting directly to Shulman’s right--opened for $1 million.  Shulman then made it $4 million to go with A-K, everyone else folded, and then Saout moved all in.  It was $10 million more to Shulman now, and after a solid minute of studying, Shulman folded his A-K.  On the surface, no one likes Shulman’s fold!  I mean, Shulman put 28% of his chips into the pot, and to fold A-K “Mathematically speaking” here you would have to know that your opponent had A-A, or K-K.  If your opponent had A-K, which is likely, then it would be a split pot.  If your opponent had a pair like Q-Q, J-J, or 10-10 which is also likely, then you would be a roughly 12-to-10 underdog, but then the pot was laying almost $19 million-to-$10 million ($4 million + $4 million + $10 million + $1 in blinds and antes).  No one likes Shulman’s fold (except Shulman and me), and even his father had mixed feelings about this fold.

在上个星期的专栏说到，J.Shulman在纽扣以9-9加注后遭到P.Ivey在大盲注用KQ全推，然后弃牌了。从ESPN的播映，这一手fold是非常居有争论性的弃牌。但是J.Shulman的最居争论性弃牌在当时的决赛场，是没有被编入在节目里边。J.Shulman fold 掉 9-9后，拥有14MM, 当 A.Saout (坐在J.Shulman的右手) 首开加注到1百万，然后J.Shulman(有AK) 再加注到4百万, 其他都丢牌， 然后A.Stout 4bet 全推。如果J.Shulman要跟牌需要多放10MM，经过一分钟的仔细的思考，J.Shulman弃掉他的AK。表面上没有人喜欢J.Shulman的弃牌! Shulman将自己的28%筹码投入后，然后弃掉AK。从数学角度来说，你必须将对手的牌的范围缩小成只有AA或KK。如果你的对手有AK(有非常的可能性),那么就是平分。如果对手有QQ,JJ,TT(也是非常有可能的),那么我们大概是 12 to 10的落后。但是窝里的钱是给予我们 19 to 10的赔率。没有人喜欢J.Shulman的弃牌(除了我和J.Shulman自己)，尽管是B.Shulman（Jeff的父亲)对这个fold得好还是不好也有质疑。

However, to me and Shulman, the fold is about three things.  First, the fact that it was probably a coin flip (Saout had Q-Q, J-J, or 10-10), and Saout may have actually have had A-A, or K-K (in which case it was nothing short of an amazing fold); second, the fold is about the “Rest of the story”; and third, the blinds were still relatively low, so why not wait for a better spot later on?  I mean, maybe two or three other players would be eliminated by the time Shulman moved all in.

但是，对我与J.Shulman来说，这个弃牌是有三点。第一，这个可能就是50/50的赌博（QQ,JJ,TT), Stout也有可能真的有AA,KK(如果是，这个是个非常惊人的弃牌)。第二是，这个弃牌是关于"后来的故事"。第三，盲注还小，所以为何我们不要等更好的机会呢？我的意思是，可能当Shulman下一次all-in的时候，已经有两三个人被淘汰了。

If it was a coin flip, then Shulman would have had $29 million if he won, or finish in eighth place if he lost.  And why gamble?  If the blinds had been bigger, and Shulman knew it was a coin flip, then he would have called.  With the blinds the way they were ($200,000 -$400,000), if Shulman knew it was a coin flip, then he could fold because of the rest of the story.

如果是50/50的赌博，那么Shulman一是可能拥有29MM, 二是在第八名出局。为什么要赌博呢？如果盲注是比较大加上J.Shulman知道是50/50,他就会跟牌了。当时的盲注是200k/400k, 如果Shulman知道是50/50的赌注，那么他可以fold, 因为“后来的故事”

As it turns out, the rest of the story is that Shulman was all in as a two-and-a-half-to-one favorite with his A-K to Cada’s A-J, and Shulman won a $14 million pot.  Then Shulman played a $22 million pot with his J-J to Cada’s 3-3 (Cada was all in this time).  But Shulman was super unlucky and lost that pot--he would have had over $30 million in chips and been down to four handed.

后来的故事”是J.Shulman以 2.5 to 1的优势 all-in, J.Shulman的AK对上Cada的AJ。J.Shulman赢了14MM的窝。然后 Cada (33）all-in, Shulman有JJ, 但是非常的不幸，Shulman输掉了这个22MM的窝。否则的话只剩下四个人, J.Shulman将会拥有超过30MM。

So the level of the blinds, and a brilliant “Rest of the story” authored by Shulman made his lay down a good one.  The lay down is only a good one because the player involved was Jeff Shulman.  In other words, do not try this lay down at home!  As I believe that 99.9% of the world should have called with the A-K.

所以以当时的盲注，加上接下来J.Shulman自己表演的精彩的“后来的故事”, 使到这个AK 的丢牌是好的。这个弃牌会是好的，因为那个玩家是J.Shulman。另一个意思是，不要弃掉这个牌在你平常的games。我相信99.9%的人会以AK跟牌。