Phil Hellmuth专栏

辛苦了！ ：）我当时就是比较闲，又想万一你不在。。。上完那个帖子后我又随便看看贴，很认真地享受了自己做的冰点心，回来发现你已经贴上了。：）我还没开工呢，一点儿资源浪费都没有。

[quote="dolphin":126sfoiq]要是mavrick1999 不在，我就先译这篇，你译下篇？

呵呵，没看到你的帖子，我刚才正在翻，要不你翻下一个吧。:-)[/quote:126sfoiq]

辛苦了！ ：）我当时就是比较闲，又想万一你不在。。。上完那个帖子后我又随便看看贴，很认真地享受了自己做的冰点心，回来发现你已经贴上了。：）我还没开工呢，一点儿资源浪费都没有。

[quote="mavrick1999":3jwapd5z][quote="dolphin":3jwapd5z]要是mavrick1999 不在，我就先译这篇，你译下篇？

呵呵，没看到你的帖子，我刚才正在翻，要不你翻下一个吧。:-)[/quote:3jwapd5z][/quote:3jwapd5z]

辛苦倒还好，就是看到冰点心，有点肚子饿了  [s:152]

Hello,Phil!
Welcome to zhiyou city.

翻译得真好，辛苦几位活雷锋了 [s:171]

期待更新

几为活雷锋，感谢！

Lesson with Jeff Shulman – Part II

In Part I, my last column, I talked about the fact that Jeff Shulman asked me to coach him for the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) “November Nine,” during the four month long break between when the players made the final table (July 15), and played the final table (November 7 and 9).  I mentioned that I had a few qualifications as a coach—at WSOP in Hold’em I have 41 final tables, and 11 wins—and that I have a soft spot in my heart for Shulman after his close call in the 2000 WSOP.  I also mentioned that Shulman had $20 million in chips, the blinds began at $125,000-$250,000, and that I advised my man to play super tight, and to come in for 5x raises (5 times the big blind) before the flop.
I loved the team aspect of coaching Shulman!  In the room, we had Diego Cordovez (a WSOP  bracelet winner in no limit Hold’em), Jeff’s father Barry Shulman (the hottest player on the planet after winning the WSOPE main event), former Cy Young winner Orel Hershisher (to help with Shulman’s mindset), and a few others that helped us simulate the final table for dozens of hours.  We printed out every single hand that was posted on the Internet that any of the other “November Nine” had played—46 pages worth—and we read them all.  We watched every hand the “November nine” played that was shown on ESPN, rewinding over-and-over when they bluffed or had a super strong hand, so that Shulman could get a good feel for his opponents.  We set up chip stacks at a poker table in accordance with the “November nine,” with pictures of each particular player in front of their respective stacks.  We played hours of seven handed-, hours of six handed-, hours of five handed-, hours of four handed-, and hours of three handed poker with each of us assuming an identity of one of the other “November Nine.”  Whenever Shulman entered a pot, we had a lengthy discussion on his tactics.  Was he playing tight enough?  Was he moving his chips well?  We really did our homework!
I pulled a new tactic out of  my bag of tricks and advised Shulman to 5x raise it pre-flop in order to keep the other players out of the pot with their small pairs (hard to call that much with a small pair), their suited connectors (hard to call that much with suited connectors), and to keep the other players from bluffing him pre-flop (hard to bluff a guy that plays super tight and raises it big when he does enter the pot).  The idea was to keep Shulman in there as long as possible—winning small pots uncontested--without something catastrophic happening.  And when someone finally did reraise Shulman, then Shulman would know they were super strong, and then perhaps he could get away from a hand like J-J.
When Shulman actually sat down at the main event final table with the ESPN cameras rolling, the live Internet broadcast going out to millions of people, and thousands of spectators observing--in the Penn and Teller Theatre—he was remarkably calm and confident.  And Shulman managed to stick to the game plan and play only one all in hand in 10 hours of play, his A-K to Joe Cada’s A-J; and when his hand held up, I thought that the rest of the players were in trouble!  Sure enough, 50 minutes later Cada was all in with his 3-3 to Shulman’s J-J, and there was over $22 million in the pot.  Shulman would now have $30 million at the start of four handed play!  Except that Cada hit his miracle three (8-7-3-4-Q) and now Shulman was down to $7 million in chips, and there were still five players remaining.  Shulman then lost a race with his 7-7 to A-9, and he was out in fifth place.  Would I change a single thing regarding coaching Shulman?  No way!  If not for a miracle three for Cada, Shulman may well have won the 2009 WSOP, well played Jeff!!

还有这么多的技巧啊

杰夫舒尔曼（Jeff Shulman）的课--第二部分

在第一部分，我的上一个专栏，我谈到在长达四个月的休赛期间，杰夫舒尔曼请我做他的WSOP's "十一月九号”（World Series of Poker)"Novermber Nine" 的辅导。 牌手们在七月十五号获得了终桌参赛权， 并且在十一月七号和九号进行了终桌比赛。 我提到我有资做这个教练----在WSOP的德州扑克比赛中我41次进入终桌，并且尔赢了11次---- 而且自从我看到他在2000年WSOP的最后一把牌之后，我心里有一个柔软的地方为舒尔曼留着。 我也提到，舒尔曼两千万筹码，大小盲从$125,000-$250,000 开始，我劝舒尔曼采用超紧打法，并且在翻牌前要提高叫牌筹码，提高到大盲的5倍来叫牌。

我喜欢我们作为一个团队来辅导舒尔曼。在房间里，我们有Diego Cordovez（WSOP无限德州扑克赛手镯获得者），杰夫的父亲Barry Shulman（在赢得了WSOPE主赛后，这个星球上最炙手可热的牌手），前Cy Young奖得主Orel Hershisher（帮助舒尔曼调整心态），还有几个帮助我们模拟终桌比赛几十小时的人。 我们打印出在网上所能找到的其他“November Nine"参赛牌手的每一手牌----46页长----我们一一读过。 我们观看了ESPN上播放的“November Nine"牌手的每一手牌，当他们Bluff或是有一手超强好牌的时候，我们会翻来覆去看很多次，这样的话舒尔曼会对他的对手很了解。 我们按照“November Nine"各个牌手的筹码数设计了一个牌桌，在每一堆筹码钱放上相应牌手的照片。 我们玩了几小时7人桌，几小时6人桌，几小时5人桌，几小时4人桌，几小时3人桌，我们每个人扮演“November Nine"不同牌手。如果舒尔曼入锅来打了，我们会花长时间讨论他的策略。他是否打的足够紧？他是否下了正确的筹码？我们真的在做我们的工作！

我拿出我的魔法袋里一个新的策略，建议舒尔曼提高叫牌筹码到大盲的5倍，目的是把其他拿了小对子（对小对子来说应5倍的叫牌比较困难），拿了同花顺子牌（ 对同花顺子来说应5倍的叫牌也比较困难）挡在锅外。也把可能在翻牌前Bluff舒尔曼的人挡住了（要想Bluff一个打得很紧并且一旦入锅就把叫牌筹码升得很高的牌手是困难的）。并且如果终于有人再抬高舒尔曼的叫牌的话，那么舒尔曼就知道对方的牌超强了，并且即便他拿了象JJ这样的牌还能脱离险境了。

当舒尔曼真的坐在WSOP主赛终桌上，ESPN的摄像机滚动着把现场网络直播传送给百万人的时候，还有成千的人在Penn and Teller剧场观看直播----舒尔曼真表现的非常冷静和自信。 舒尔曼努力跟着计划走，并且10小时内之玩儿了一手 All-in， 他的A-k对Joe Cada的A-J; 当舒尔曼保持领先赢了的时候，我觉得其他的选手陷入麻烦了。 当然是，50分钟后Cada拿了他的3-3对牌All-in来应叫舒尔曼的J-J， 锅里有两千两白万。如果不是Cada击中他那神奇的3（8-7-3-4-Q)，舒尔曼将会有三千万来开始四人桌比赛，但是舒尔曼只剩下7百万筹码了，并且还有5个牌手在比赛。舒尔曼的对7又输给了A-9,作为第5名出局了。  我是不是会改变一点点辅导舒尔曼的策略呢？ 不可能！ 如果Cada没有击中神奇的3，舒尔曼很可能赢得2009 WSOP， 打得好！杰夫！

Lesson with Jeff Shulman – Part II

In Part I, my last column, I talked about the fact that Jeff Shulman asked me to coach him for the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) “November Nine,” during the four month long break between when the players made the final table (July 15), and played the final table (November 7 and 9).  I mentioned that I had a few qualifications as a coach—at WSOP in Hold’em I have 41 final tables, and 11 wins—and that I have a soft spot in my heart for Shulman after his close call in the 2000 WSOP.  I also mentioned that Shulman had $20 million in chips, the blinds began at $125,000-$250,000, and that I advised my man to play super tight, and to come in for 5x raises (5 times the big blind) before the flop.
I loved the team aspect of coaching Shulman!  In the room, we had Diego Cordovez (a WSOP  bracelet winner in no limit Hold’em), Jeff’s father Barry Shulman (the hottest player on the planet after winning the WSOPE main event), former Cy Young winner Orel Hershisher (to help with Shulman’s mindset), and a few others that helped us simulate the final table for dozens of hours.  We printed out every single hand that was posted on the Internet that any of the other “November Nine” had played—46 pages worth—and we read them all.  We watched every hand the “November nine” played that was shown on ESPN, rewinding over-and-over when they bluffed or had a super strong hand, so that Shulman could get a good feel for his opponents.  We set up chip stacks at a poker table in accordance with the “November nine,” with pictures of each particular player in front of their respective stacks.  We played hours of seven handed-, hours of six handed-, hours of five handed-, hours of four handed-, and hours of three handed poker with each of us assuming an identity of one of the other “November Nine.”  Whenever Shulman entered a pot, we had a lengthy discussion on his tactics.  Was he playing tight enough?  Was he moving his chips well?  We really did our homework!
I pulled a new tactic out of  my bag of tricks and advised Shulman to 5x raise it pre-flop in order to keep the other players out of the pot with their small pairs (hard to call that much with a small pair), their suited connectors (hard to call that much with suited connectors), and to keep the other players from bluffing him pre-flop (hard to bluff a guy that plays super tight and raises it big when he does enter the pot).  The idea was to keep Shulman in there as long as possible—winning small pots uncontested--without something catastrophic happening.  And when someone finally did reraise Shulman, then Shulman would know they were super strong, and then perhaps he could get away from a hand like J-J.
When Shulman actually sat down at the main event final table with the ESPN cameras rolling, the live Internet broadcast going out to millions of people, and thousands of spectators observing--in the Penn and Teller Theatre—he was remarkably calm and confident.  And Shulman managed to stick to the game plan and play only one all in hand in 10 hours of play, his A-K to Joe Cada’s A-J; and when his hand held up, I thought that the rest of the players were in trouble!  Sure enough, 50 minutes later Cada was all in with his 3-3 to Shulman’s J-J, and there was over $22 million in the pot.  Shulman would now have $30 million at the start of four handed play!  Except that Cada hit his miracle three (8-7-3-4-Q) and now Shulman was down to $7 million in chips, and there were still five players remaining.  Shulman then lost a race with his 7-7 to A-9, and he was out in fifth place.  Would I change a single thing regarding coaching Shulman?  No way!  If not for a miracle three for Cada, Shulman may well have won the 2009 WSOP, well played Jeff!!