Phil Hellmuth专栏

Just saw the picture in a magazine :  Caesar and 11 models in white Roman dresses.    The Caesar really has hairy legs.

Phil的专栏在智游城是第一时间发表，而且有些是杂志专栏之外的。Phil本来还愿意通过iphone等手段提供他在牌桌的即时信息，可惜我们实在没有精力。也许等智游城壮大了会考虑为大家提供更多的服务。

I think it is a good decision that Phil goes back to his style.  Small ball is too much for sensitive fragile Cancers.  Cancers are not good at taking swings, ups and downs.  That is not to say Cancers are weak players.  Actually Cancers are tenacious and compassionate, if they set their goals, they will win in a long run.

Well, I have watched a few videos of Phil playing poker, including the one he beats Johnny Chan at 1989 WSOP.  What really interests me is, how his instinct leads the play.  Cancers have strong instincts  -- that is, they feel it, and most of the time, the feeling is right.  But sometimes, when the instinct goes wrong, it just goes so wrong -- Phil was knocked out of 2009 WSOP by playing a pair of 4 against a much strong hand.

Playing the Cards

I have been playing too many hands for awhile now, and it has yielded zero wins, but a few chip leads.  Consistently playing 8c-7c--and similar suited connectors--for raises and reraises, causes some big swings.  So if you want to play this way, strap on your seatbelt, you have a turbulent ride ahead of you!  Basically, be prepared to be eliminated on Day One in events that are designed to eliminate 10% of the field on Day One—like has happened to me on at least a dozen occasions in the last 14 months.  Then, occasionally, you will also have the chip lead after Day One—this happened twice.  The problem with this style of play is the frequency with which you end up going all in.  Yes, the 8c-7c is terrific when it comes down 8-7-3, but how about when it comes J-8-3 and your lone opponent has K-K?  Sometimes you end up losing so many chips early, and because you are playing lots of pots (you have a loose table image), when you do move all in with your A-K, J-J, or K-K, you get called by the A-Q.  Congrats, you have A-K vs. A-Q, but still, you’re all in on Day One!
So now that I was out there on the “Playing too many hands” kick for over a year, it was only natural that I over-adjust to the play super tight and “Make one move per hour” strategy.  I started this strategy in Aruba.  I folded suited connectors for a raise, or a reraise, and I rarely bluffed.  I would, on occasion, reraise with a hand like K-Q suited, but only when I thought that it was the best hand.  This style kept me out of trouble on Day One, where I ran up my starting stack for $15,000 to $50,000 completely risk free—my double up hand I limped with As-Js under the gun, flopped a flush, and doubled up against two players who were drawing dead.  On Day Two I ran horribly, but not in any one given pot.  I think that I had one pair of pocket kings, no straights, no sets, no flushes, and no other big pairs!  Still, I managed to break even for the day, to never be all in the entire day, and thus end the day with around $50,000.  Zero all ins in two days: playing super tight does have its advantages!  On Day Three I finally played a coin flip with pocket jacks vs. their K-Q suited (the guy played horribly to even be in that pot).  Then I picked up A-A, vs. their K-K and their Ac-Kc, and was able to get all in, only to lose some of my chips (the K-K won with a river king, but I had more chips than he did).  Finally, with 54 players left, and 45 getting paid, I moved all in with Ah-Kh, and ran into A-A; good day, Phil!
Still, I was encouraged.  It felt like the old days where I was getting all of my money in pre-flop with A-A, K-K, A-K, and occasionally Q-Q.  The problem with this strategy is that it depends on the cards.  The strength is that you can, with some effort, make it through whole days without ever being all in.
Going into the $15,000 buy in World Poker Tour tournament at the Bellagio, the Festa Al Lago, I decided to make roughly one over-the-top move per hour.  I figure that the over-the-top move works around 75% of the time anyway, but for me it works almost 90% of the time (because of my reading ability).  And with a starting stack of $60,000, in the middle of Day Two, I found myself effortlessly folding hand-after-hand.  It felt good!  Late in Day Two, with the blinds at $800-$1,600, I put $45,000 of my $60,000 starting stack in the middle with my A-K to their Q-Q, but I lost.  Then one hour later I was all in for my last $20,000 with my A-K to their J-J, and I lost.  So since switching back to super tight poker, my last four big pots I was all in pre-flop with A-K, A-A, A-K, and A-K.  I lost all four, but so what?  This is Phil Hellmuth poker!

真为坐守智游城而骄傲，我感觉自己现在打牌比过去从容多了，不象过去，提心吊胆的。 [s:171]

[quote="dolphin":31ucldmk]Just saw the picture in a magazine :  Caesar and 11 models in white Roman dresses.    The Caesar really has hairy legs.

Phil的专栏在智游城是第一时间发表，而且有些是杂志专栏之外的。Phil本来还愿意通过iphone等手段提供他在牌桌的即时信息，可惜我们实在没有精力。也许等智游城壮大了会考虑为大家提供更多的服务。[/quote:31ucldmk]

我激动了，虽天涯，却咫尺。。。

Lessons with Jeff Shulman – Part 1

On Day Eight of the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) main event—way back on July 15--the tournament was halted when they reached the final nine players.  The chips were bagged up, the players were interviewed by ESPN, the worldwide media left the building, and the players were sent home until November 7th.  On November 7th, the players, now called the “November Nine,” returned to play down to the final two players; and then on Sunday, November 9, they would play until we had the 2009 World Champion of Poker.
With four months in between reaching the final table, and playing out that final table, a lot could be done to improve one’s chances of winning the 2009 World Champion of Poker moniker.  With that in mind, some players sought out “Poker coaches” to help them refine their end game strategies, or to help makeover their game altogether.  Jeff Shulman came to me, and I readily agreed to coach him.  Now first off, I was there at the final table of the WSOP in 2000 doing a “Live Internet” broadcast--on Andy Glazers clunky cell phone--when Shulman had some horrendously bad luck to finish in seventh place, and I have a soft spot in my heart for what happened to him that year.  With seven players remaining and a massive chip lead Shulman had Chris “Jesus” Ferguson all in for roughly $800,000 apiece with Shulman’s 7-7 to Ferguson’s 6-6.  If Shulman’s hand had held up, then he would have had $3.2 million, which looked pretty sweet alongside the next highest chip stack of around $500,000!  Instead, Shulman lost that one, picked up K-K a few hands later, ran into Ferguson’s A-A, and was eliminated—from penthouse to outhouse!  The next day I kept Shulman’s name alive in our broadcast because he deserved better than he was served!
The second reason I agreed to help Shulman is that we are business partners—I am the third largest shareholder in “Card Player” magazine.  A third reason is that I firmly believed that I could help Shulman tactically, even though are styles are similar.  I mean, my Hold’em resume is pretty good.  I have over 30 final tables at the WSOP in Hold’em (#1 by far), and 11 victories (#1 by far), and I won the 1989 main event.  I believe that I did help, and now that the “November Nine” is over, I can reveal the “Lesson plan.”
Firstly, we had a group including Adam Schoenfeld, pitcher Orel Herhisher, WSOP bracelet winner Diego Cordovez, and Shulman’s own father Barry--who just won the WSOPE main event—that played out hand scenarios and discussed tactics.  Secondly, we printed out every hand that each of the other “November nine” members had played throughout the WSOP, a packet of 50 pages, and read them all.  Third, we watched every move on the ESPN coverage.  Since Shulman started with $20 million in chips, and the blinds were $125,000-$250,000 we knew that there was tons of time left in the structure for Shulman to “Work his chips.”  With the goal of making it down to the final three in the easiest possible manner, I recommended that Shulman employ a super safe and super tight strategy, especially nine handed and eight handed.  Jeff liked it, and Barry backed it up because he had just won the WSOPE employing a similar strategy at that final table.  After racking my brains for a month, I recommended that Shulman open the pot for 4x, or 5x sized bets.  So with $125,000-$250,000 blinds, I asked him to open for at least $1 million.  Why?  Well, I didn’t think that the other players at the table would take flops with small pairs or suited connectors for such a high price, or that they would come over the top of someone playing super tight, and opening for that much money with a bluffing type of hand.  Thus, I thought that those big opening bets would force everyone else to fold their weaker hands, and reduce the number of over the top bluffs that Shulman would have to face, and thus would allow Shulman to pick up a lot of small pots uncontested.  Also, if Shulman did have a hand like 10-10, and someone did make a reraise, then it would be a lot easier for him to fold his 10-10, because presumably his opponent would have an over-pair or A-K.
In dis-incentivizing his opponents from flopping a set or attempting to bluff him, in taking down small pots, and in general just hanging around his starting stack, my hope was that Shulman would last a long time with zero pressure.  I was also hoping that the other eight players would bust themselves needlessly, like they did at the 2008 “November Nine.”  So my first lesson to Shulman was to play super tight and open for at least 4x until it stopped working, or until they hit five handed.

哇 更新了，抢个位置慢慢看

要是mavrick1999 不在，我就先译这篇，你译下篇？

Lessons with Jeff Shulman – Part 1

On Day Eight of the WSOP’s (World Series of Poker) main event—way back on July 15--the tournament was halted when they reached the final nine players.  The chips were bagged up, the players were interviewed by ESPN, the worldwide media left the building, and the players were sent home until November 7th.  On November 7th, the players, now called the “November Nine,” returned to play down to the final two players; and then on Sunday, November 9, they would play until we had the 2009 World Champion of Poker.
With four months in between reaching the final table, and playing out that final table, a lot could be done to improve one’s chances of winning the 2009 World Champion of Poker moniker.  With that in mind, some players sought out “Poker coaches” to help them refine their end game strategies, or to help makeover their game altogether.  Jeff Shulman came to me, and I readily agreed to coach him.  Now first off, I was there at the final table of the WSOP in 2000 doing a “Live Internet” broadcast--on Andy Glazers clunky cell phone--when Shulman had some horrendously bad luck to finish in seventh place, and I have a soft spot in my heart for what happened to him that year.  With seven players remaining and a massive chip lead Shulman had Chris “Jesus” Ferguson all in for roughly $800,000 apiece with Shulman’s 7-7 to Ferguson’s 6-6.  If Shulman’s hand had held up, then he would have had $3.2 million, which looked pretty sweet alongside the next highest chip stack of around $500,000!  Instead, Shulman lost that one, picked up K-K a few hands later, ran into Ferguson’s A-A, and was eliminated—from penthouse to outhouse!  The next day I kept Shulman’s name alive in our broadcast because he deserved better than he was served!
The second reason I agreed to help Shulman is that we are business partners—I am the third largest shareholder in “Card Player” magazine.  A third reason is that I firmly believed that I could help Shulman tactically, even though are styles are similar.  I mean, my Hold’em resume is pretty good.  I have over 30 final tables at the WSOP in Hold’em (#1 by far), and 11 victories (#1 by far), and I won the 1989 main event.  I believe that I did help, and now that the “November Nine” is over, I can reveal the “Lesson plan.”
Firstly, we had a group including Adam Schoenfeld, pitcher Orel Herhisher, WSOP bracelet winner Diego Cordovez, and Shulman’s own father Barry--who just won the WSOPE main event—that played out hand scenarios and discussed tactics.  Secondly, we printed out every hand that each of the other “November nine” members had played throughout the WSOP, a packet of 50 pages, and read them all.  Third, we watched every move on the ESPN coverage.  Since Shulman started with $20 million in chips, and the blinds were $125,000-$250,000 we knew that there was tons of time left in the structure for Shulman to “Work his chips.”  With the goal of making it down to the final three in the easiest possible manner, I recommended that Shulman employ a super safe and super tight strategy, especially nine handed and eight handed.  Jeff liked it, and Barry backed it up because he had just won the WSOPE employing a similar strategy at that final table.  After racking my brains for a month, I recommended that Shulman open the pot for 4x, or 5x sized bets.  So with $125,000-$250,000 blinds, I asked him to open for at least $1 million.  Why?  Well, I didn’t think that the other players at the table would take flops with small pairs or suited connectors for such a high price, or that they would come over the top of someone playing super tight, and opening for that much money with a bluffing type of hand.  Thus, I thought that those big opening bets would force everyone else to fold their weaker hands, and reduce the number of over the top bluffs that Shulman would have to face, and thus would allow Shulman to pick up a lot of small pots uncontested.  Also, if Shulman did have a hand like 10-10, and someone did make a reraise, then it would be a lot easier for him to fold his 10-10, because presumably his opponent would have an over-pair or A-K.
In dis-incentivizing his opponents from flopping a set or attempting to bluff him, in taking down small pots, and in general just hanging around his starting stack, my hope was that Shulman would last a long time with zero pressure.  I was also hoping that the other eight players would bust themselves needlessly, like they did at the 2008 “November Nine.”  So my first lesson to Shulman was to play super tight and open for at least 4x until it stopped working, or until they hit five handed.

指导Jeff Shulman – 第一部分

在今年WSOP主赛事的第八天—7月15日—比赛因为最终桌9人的决出而暂停。在筹码封存，ESPN采访了最终桌选手后，各路媒体相继离开，9名选手也暂时回家等待11月7日的最终桌比赛。11月7日，这九名选手将会回来继续比赛直到决出最后两人，两天后，也就是11月9日星期天，这两人将会决出2009年的WSOP主赛事冠军。

在最终桌到来之前的四个月里，选手们都会想办法提升自己获得WSOP冠军称号的机会。因此，一些选手开始寻找扑克教练来帮助他们提高最后阶段的战术。Jeff Shulman找到了我，我欣然同意指导他。第一个原因是，2000的WSOP决赛桌，当时我在现场用Andy Glazer的破手机做一个网络现场直播，目睹了Shulman被不可思议的坏运气击倒在第7名，我很为他难过。当时桌上还有7人，Shulman筹码领先，一把Shulman设法让Chris “Jesus” Ferguson全下了他的80万筹码，Shulman的一对7对Ferguson的一对6。如果Shulman胜出，他将有320万筹码，远超筹码第二位的50万。然而，Shulman输了那把，没过几手，Shulman拿到KK，不幸撞上了Ferguson的AA被淘汰，从天堂掉到地狱。第二天我在直播中不断提到Shulman的名字，因为我觉得老天对他太不公平了。

我同意指导Shulman的第二个原因是我们是生意上的伙伴，我是“Card Player”杂志的第三大股东。第三个原因是我完全相信尽管我们的风格类似，我依然能够在战术上帮助到Shulman，毕竟我在德州扑克上的成就有目共睹。我有超过30次的WSOP德州扑克决赛桌经验（历史第一），并赢了其中的11次（历史第一），其中包括1989年的主赛事冠军。我自信我能提供帮助。现在决赛桌已经结束，我可以向大家透露我的训练计划了。

首先，我们有一个小组来讨论牌例和战术，小组成员包括Adam Schoenfeld, pitcher Orel Herhisher, WSOP手链拥有者Diego Cordovez，和Shulman的父亲，刚刚赢得WSOP欧洲主赛事冠军的Barry。其次，我们把8位对手在本次WSOP中的每一手牌打印出来（50页的一大摞）并仔细研究。第三，我们仔细观察了对手们在ESPN转播中的每一个动作。由于Shulman在决赛开始时依然有两千万筹码，而盲注只有125000/250000，我们认为Shulman拥有足够的时间来增加筹码。为了达成用最小的风险先进入前三的目标，我建议Shulman采用超级保守和超级紧的策略，尤其是桌上有还有8到9名选手的时候。Shulman赞同这个方案，他父亲Barry也支持这个方案，Barry也是采用类似的策略在WSOP欧洲主赛事中取得了冠军。在潜心研究一个月后，我建议Shulman第一个进入彩池时要加注到4或者5倍盲注，也就是说大盲25万的时候，我要求Shulman加注到至少100万。为什么呢？理由是在这么大的一个翻牌前加注下，我不认为对手们会用小对或者同花连张去跟，同时也降低了对手再加注偷鸡一个超紧玩家的可能性。因此，我认为翻牌前强力加注会迫使其他人扔掉他们的弱起手牌，也减少了Shulman可能面对的再加注偷鸡，从而让Shulman没有抵抗的拿下很多小彩池。同时，如果Shulman拿到TT，而有人再加注，Shulman可以很容易的扔掉TT，因为很大可能对手有超对或者AK。

别让对手便宜的用小对看到翻牌成暗三，或者试图用小对偷鸡，争取在翻牌前多拿下些盲注，维持住目前的筹码数量，凭借这些策略我期望Shulman可以在比赛开始后毫无压力的维持很长一段时间。我同时希望在此期间其他八个人会鲁莽的自相残杀，就像08年的决赛桌一样。总而言之，我给Shulman的第一课就是超紧打法，用4到5倍盲注的加注进入彩池，直到这个方法失去效果，或者桌上只剩5人。

要是mavrick1999 不在，我就先译这篇，你译下篇？

呵呵，没看到你的帖子，我刚才正在翻，要不你翻下一个吧。:-)

写的好，翻的妙。都辛苦啦。谢谢！